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From Global to Local Tea Markets: The Changing




The growth of emerging economies has led to a significant expansion of do-
mestic markets in the global South. Yet, the vast majority of studies examin-
ing contemporary patterns of trade and production continue to use a global
value chain (GVC) lens, therefore obfuscating important spatial and tem-
poral shifts occurring within domestic geographies of production in the early
decades of the 21st century. This article explores how a rapid increase in do-
mestic consumption in the case of Indian tea production has transformed
the industry, and how institutional and regulatory actors have responded to
these changes. Using a value chain framework to explore the key actors and
processes shaping the political economy of domestic production, this article
identifies three processes which have driven the creation of new trade and
production structures within India’s domestic tea market: a significant rise in
the outsourcing and fragmentation of the production process; the expansion
of smallholder-led production; and the introduction of private standards and
governance programmes within the domestically oriented segment of pro-
duction. These trends have important implications for the tea industry and
shed light on how domestic markets in the global South are being trans-
formed under 21st century geographies of trade and consumption.
INTRODUCTION
Producers in the global South are often engaged in the production of goods
and services for multiple end markets (Horner and Nadvi, 2018). However,
the predominant literature on the organization of trade and production un-
der globalization has overwhelmingly focused on the coordination of global
value chains (GVCs) wherein producers in the global South supply goods
and services to lead firms in the global North (Gereffi et al., 2005). While
South–North trade linkages can be important for producers in terms of value
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addition, there are few empirical studies of how regional and domestic value
chains have evolved under contemporary spatial and temporal dynamics of
trade (for exceptions, see Krishnan, 2018; Pasquali et al., 2020). Although
scholars have begun to examine the socio-economic implications of South–
South trade for producers (for example, Bloomfield, 2020), more research is
needed to understand how localized value chains are coordinated and gov-
erned, and how they compare with the governance of production for export
markets (i.e. within GVCs). This is particularly significant given the con-
tinued economic expansion in the global South and the growth of local and
regional markets in developing countries (Horner, 2016).
This article illuminates the ways through which a global perspective has
obfuscated important shifts in geographies of production and trade in the
21st century. Using the case of the Indian tea industry, the article highlights
distinctions in the political economy of production for different end markets
(domestic and global) and demonstrates the ways in which growing domes-
tic consumption continues to reshape such distinctions. The case of Indian
tea is particularly apt for the study of evolving value chain dynamics be-
cause, over the course of the 20th century, the industry has shifted from one
which was primarily export-driven (and directed through British colonial oc-
cupation) to one in which approximately 90 per cent of production feeds the
local market (Arya, 2013). This article therefore asks, ‘how has the political
economy of Indian tea production evolved in relation to the rapid expansion
of domestic consumption, and what are the regulatory implications?’.
Domestic markets in the global South have tended to be characterized as
highly competitive, with producers competing over small margins within a
lax regulatory environment (Knorringa, 2014). This has led to claims that
the expansion of domestic markets may lead to a ‘race to the bottom’ for
labour and environmental standards (Kaplinsky and Farooki, 2010). Con-
trary to these claims, other scholars have demonstrated a growing regulatory
interest on the part of Southern actors in shaping the dynamics of production
within local markets (Bartley, 2014; Schouten and Bitzer, 2015). Yet, what is
often overlooked is the dialectic between the two, and how the rise of value
chain relations in these competitive markets may amplify these competing
tensions in the context of expanding consumption.
This article highlights the ways in which the contemporary political econ-
omy of Indian tea production is reshaping the above tensions in the case of
the domestic market. It begins by demonstrating how changing dynamics of
global and local competition led the largest domestic tea firms to switch
from a vertically integrated model of production to a fragmented model
characterized by outsourcing and subcontracting. It continues by illustrat-
ing the linkages between the emergence of a domestic value chain and the
expansion of smallholder production, and the implications of this expansion
for competition and for value capture. Finally, it highlights how these crit-
ical changes have led to new and growing governance gaps in which both
market and state actors have sought to (re)govern production in the wake
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of increased public scrutiny. As the vast majority of tea produced in India
is for domestic consumption, this case highlights the need to look beyond
the GVC, and to critically analyse the construction of domestic value chains
(DVCs) in the global South. It highlights the importance of changing end-
market characteristics in emerging economies and calls for future research
to further examine the governance of overlapping production chains feeding
local as well as global end markets.
The rest of the article is structured as follows. The first section discusses
the increased significance of domestic-oriented production in the global
South in the early decades of the 21st century. It highlights the key assump-
tions regarding contemporary patterns of governance within Southern mar-
kets and draws upon the GVC framework to highlight the roles that various
actors play in the coordination and governance of production. The follow-
ing two sections introduce the methodological approach, and then go on to
highlight the transition of Indian tea production from an export-oriented in-
dustry to one which predominantly produces for the domestic market. The
final substantive section examines the emergence of a domestic value chain
in India’s local tea market and demonstrates how contemporary trends re-
lated to sourcing, primary production and governance have impacted the
political economy of production for the domestic market.
DOMESTIC VALUE CHAINS: CONSIDERATIONS IN AN ERA OF
POLYCENTRIC TRADE
From Global to Domestic: Shifting Geographies of Trade
Domestic value chains have gained attention in recent years as global trade
has become increasingly multi-polar in character (Horner and Nadvi, 2018).
A focus on the DVC recognizes that trade is a significant feature of local
(as well as global) economies and is expanding as emerging economies be-
come key sources of demand as well as sources of production (Horner, 2016;
Pickles et al., 2016). As South–South trade increases, geographies of trade
are increasingly multi-directional, leading to a growth in polycentric trade
(Horner and Nadvi, 2018). The considerable growth in the volume of do-
mestic and regional trade within large economies has prompted calls to fur-
ther study the coordination and governance of domestic markets by private
and public actors (Bush et al., 2015). Criticisms have therefore emerged of a
‘Northern’ perspective due to its limited focus on the flows of goods and ser-
vices from producers in the global South to consumers in the global North
(Murphy, 2008).
In spite of this recognition, the majority of value chain studies continue
to focus on the global coordination of trade and production (Barrientos,
2013; Mayer and Pickles, 2010). This is due to the genesis of the frame-
work within the initial phase of globalization, in which lead firms from
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industrialized countries reshaped the global economy through the outsourc-
ing of production across borders to countries with lower labour costs (Ger-
effi et al., 2005). Today, the hegemony of these lead firms (predominantly
based in the global North) is challenged by the emergence of new trade
and production dynamics within contemporary globalization. The rapid
economic expansion of Southern countries, most notably India, China and
Brazil, has irrevocably altered geographies of trade and consumption (Hen-
derson and Nadvi, 2011; Nadvi, 2014). This has been accompanied by
changing geographies of corporate and geopolitical power as demonstrated
through the rise of lead firms from these countries that are often depen-
dent upon the large domestic markets in which they are established (Horner
and Nadvi, 2018). It is therefore critical to understand how trade within do-
mestic markets is organized and to identify the key actors coordinating and
governing the production of goods and services for domestic markets. One
way to do this is through the lens of the DVC, which is defined as a chain of
production in which ‘local lead firms organize and lead … sourcing from na-
tional suppliers [in order to] feed demand in domestic end markets’ (Horner
and Nadvi, 2018: 222). Although the DVC framework is analytically analo-
gous to the GVC framework, it is important to reflect on how value chains
embedded in local markets have been historically treated by the GVC ap-
proach, and how institutional differences within national borders might im-
pact on the development of DVCs in different ways to that of cross-border
GVCs.
Conceptualizing the Domestic Market through the GVC Approach
Traditionally, domestic markets within producer countries have been over-
looked due to the tendency to promote export-oriented production within
policy circles (Horner, 2016). As such, value chain analysis has predom-
inantly focused on how producers become embedded within global mar-
kets and the socio-economic and developmental implications of their em-
beddedness within particular types of value chain (Gereffi et al., 2005). A
key focus within this literature has been on the use of standards by lead
firms to coordinate cross-border production and the capacity for producers
to meet buyer requirements (Gibbon and Ponte, 2005; Nadvi and Wältring,
2004). The higher barriers to entry created through product and process
standards have meant that producers with limited capital, knowledge and/or
skills have tended to be excluded from GVCs altogether (Gibbon and Ponte,
2005; Nadvi, 2008). The (in)ability to meet standards has therefore become
a key means of ensuring product differentiation and competitive advantage
for producers (Barrientos et al., 2011). In this light, the domestic market is
seen as the least desirable option for producers, reserved for those unable to
meet standards or to acquire the economies of scale needed for exports.
This is where the boundaries of analysis have typically ended, therefore
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obscuring the dynamics of domestic markets which shape local processes
and patterns of production.
The increasingly polycentric character of global trade challenges the pri-
macy of export-led growth because the expansion of domestic markets of-
fers producers different choices and potentially different development tra-
jectories compared to previous generations (Horner and Nadvi, 2018). The
noted growth in South–South trade reinforces the argument to look beyond
the ‘global’ and to examine how different geographies of consumption may
affect producers and production (Bush et al., 2015). It is in this context that
a number of new studies have emerged which have sought to understand
the shifting patterns of governance under these broader transformations and
the likely implications for producers (Knorringa and Nadvi, 2016; Pasquali
et al., 2020).
Such studies have indicated that Southern lead firms may not engage in
practices of outsourcing to the same extent as Northern firms, instead pre-
ferring to operate within tightly integrated systems of production (Gereffi,
2014). Furthermore, it has been argued that Southern-oriented value chains
may not use product and process standards to the extent seen within the
global North (ibid.). This may be linked to the relative proximity between
suppliers and buyers, less extensive use of subcontracting as well as fewer
market and/or institutional pressures to use standards. This has led to the
argument that local firms and producers may be able to upgrade to higher
value-adding functions in the value chain without the associated costs typi-
cally needed to access Northern markets, such as conforming to stringent
European standards (Horner, 2016). If this is the case, lower barriers to
entry could aid the participation of developing country firms within value
chains by allowing them to engage in value-adding activities which would
have been difficult to achieve otherwise (Gereffi, 2014). Some argue that
South–South trade between countries may lead to more sustainable produc-
tion practices, due to more equal trading relations (Bloomfield, 2020). How-
ever, a more pessimistic view of Southern market expansion predicts that
lower regulations could ‘lock suppliers into slimmer margins and cut-throat
competition’ (Gereffi, 2014: 23). Indeed, studies tend to illustrate that SMEs
supplying local markets may often be caught in a race to the bottom due
to low margins and a lack of consumer demand for high quality products
(Knorringa, 2014).
Lead firms coordinating GVCs may select suppliers based on differences
in national regulations, geographical proximity to market, cost of produc-
tion and labour productivity. The same may apply to lead firms coordinating
DVCs given that institutional differences in particular locales may be a con-
tributing factor in determining how firms pursue competitive advantage. For
example, local variations in legal frameworks and regulations could be a
decisive factor in determining the geographies of lead firm sourcing. The
cost and/or productivity of labour could also vary significantly by region.
Furthermore, industries may often be segmented into formal and informal
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production systems in which the former is subject to laws and regulations
and the latter operates outside of state purview (Chen, 2007). However,
price is not the only consideration and firms will consider various types
of risk when determining who their key suppliers are, such as concerns over
the quality of production and/or the potential loss of control over activities
(Azmeh, 2019).
Institutions Shaping Domestic Markets
Value chain studies have tended to focus on the inter-firm commercial dy-
namics which shape the governance of production (for example, Gereffi
et al., 2005). However, the institutional environment plays an important and
often overlooked role shaping the configuration of value chains (Fransen,
2013). A vast literature within global governance remedies this by high-
lighting the ways through which public, civic and private actors have shaped
the regulation of transnational production networks resulting in a plethora
of public and private standards (Barrientos et al., 2011; Mayer and Pickles,
2010). While there are limits to private and public forms of governance, it
is nevertheless clear that the institutional environment plays a significant
role in governing the activities of lead firms, whether they are coordinating
global or domestic value chains.
Discussions of how domestic value chains are shaped and structured
should also pay close attention to the role of national institutions (both for-
mal and informal). Typically, institutional capacity within developing coun-
tries is perceived as weak due to limited resources and/or a lack of ability
to implement new regulations and governance programmes because of po-
litical constraints (Kaplinsky and Farooki, 2010). From this perspective, it
is assumed that the relatively low barriers to entry will benefit smaller en-
terprises with lower capacity (particularly in the informal sector) and inten-
sify cut-throat competition. This would likely heighten worker vulnerability
to exploitation and lead to a race to the bottom for producers. Yet, these
assumptions are challenged by increasing evidence of the largely heteroge-
neous roles played by the state and other institutional actors in emerging
economies, with some evidence of a ‘regulatory renaissance’ taking place,
particularly in Latin America (Coslovsky, 2014; Piore and Schrank, 2008).
Due to state sovereignty, public actors can play a greater role in regulating
domestic (as opposed to global) value chains due to the fact that each stage
of the production process is undertaken within the national border. Yet, the
incentive for state actors to intervene will likely be influenced by broader
political and economic factors (LeBaron and Phillips, 2018).
Further evidence of heterogeneous institutional pressures within domestic
markets relates to changing consumer preferences. The growth of the global
middle class may result in increased concerns over the quality of goods
and services purchased, a preference for branded products and a heightened
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awareness of social and environmental issues within production processes
(Kharas, 2017). This may lead Southern lead firms to consider the use of
standards to differentiate products sold, or to assure consumers that quality
standards are met. There is already some evidence to suggest this may be the
case as new standards governing social and environmental issues of produc-
tion have emerged in the global South (Langford, 2019; Schouten and Bitzer,
2015). These Southern-led standards are often predicated upon differing
forms of legitimacy compared to standards governing exports and typically
have higher government involvement (Giessen et al., 2017; Schouten and
Bitzer, 2015).
While the implications of increased South–South trade for value chain
studies have begun to be addressed (Gereffi, 2014; Horner and Nadvi, 2018),
there has been little attention paid to how the coordination of production in
large domestic end markets is being shaped by changing market dynam-
ics. The expansion of middle-class consumption, changing consumer pref-
erences and higher levels of outsourcing all pose significant questions re-
garding the coordination and governance of production within Southern end
markets. By examining these spatial and temporal shifts through a value
chain lens, it is possible to better understand and compare the ways in which
domestic actors (in particularly domestic lead firms in the South) coordinate
and govern production, and how this impacts upon the regulatory frame-
works governing producers. This is critical given the increasingly significant
size of Southern domestic markets within the global economy.
CASE STUDY METHODOLOGY
This article explores these issues through the case of Indian tea. A case study
methodology (Yin, 2009) was used to generate insightful data to capture the
global and local dynamics and processes which are spatially and temporally
transforming the political economy of Indian tea production. Fieldwork was
undertaken in the UK, The Netherlands and India (primarily Delhi, Ban-
galore and Kolkata) between 2014 and 2018, during which in-depth, semi-
structured interviews were conducted with 59 individuals representing lead
firms, supplier firms, government bodies and civil society actors (includ-
ing trade unions). Table 1 offers a breakdown of interviewees by type and
number.
Interviewees were selected due to their involvement in the production,
regulation and/or governance of Indian tea for export and/or domestic end
markets. The majority of interviews took place in Kolkata, the north-eastern
hub for firms involved in tea production and sales. Interviews explored the
historical shifts within the industry, the role of end-market requirements in
shaping the political economy of production, the impact of growing domes-
tic consumption and the governance of production through national laws and
regulations, civil society initiatives and standards.
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Table 1. Interviewee Type and Number
Participant type Interviewee type Number of participants




Public Government officials 3
Global institutions 4




Key questions raised in the interviews facilitated the mapping and docu-
mentation of the actors and processes that are reshaping the political econ-
omy of tea production as the bulk of consumption has shifted from export
markets to the domestic market. The value chain framework was selected
due to its ability to delineate change and transformation within the orga-
nization of production through the systematic mapping of the key actors
and processes shaping cross-border production of a particular good or ser-
vice (Barrientos, 2002). Interviews were supplemented by secondary data
sources including trade data and reports produced by companies, govern-
ments and civil society organizations linked to the Indian and global tea
sectors. The tea sector was selected because the location of end markets has
dramatically shifted over the past 30 years, with implications for the ways in
which export versus domestic market requirements impact on the political
economy of tea production. While many studies have examined the dynam-
ics of export-oriented production (e.g. Besky, 2008; Neilson and Pritchard,
2011) there has been very little empirical exploration of the changing struc-
tures of domestic-oriented tea production in spite of the fact that the major-
ity of tea produced in India is domestically consumed. The following section
demonstrates the shifts in the geographies of trade and consumption within
the Indian tea industry from the colonial era to the present day.
The INDIAN TEA TRADE: FROM UNIDIRECTIONAL TO
MULTIDIRECTIONAL
The Historical Development of the Indian Tea Industry: A Political Economy
Perspective
Historically, the Indian tea sector has depended upon exports both in volume
and value terms (Gupta, 1997; Misra, 1987). The industry developed under
British occupation and production was shaped by an extractive colonial trade
model in which the majority of tea was exported to meet the growing de-
mands of the British market, in an age of rapid industrial expansion (Besky,
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2008; Chatterjee, 2001). Tight control by the British Administration meant a
vertically integrated system of production, with individual firms controlling
all aspects of production. Indian plantation estates were owned and oper-
ated by British firms throughout this period (Achinto, 2013). Workers were
forcibly brought into Assam (the original site of tea production in India)
from tribal communities in Central India, and became indentured labourers
on the estates (Behal, 2010). During the 19th century, the British market re-
mained the primary export market. However, exogenous economic factors
in the early 20th century (most notably the Great Depression) led British
companies in India to seek alternative markets (Gupta, 1997). During this
period, attempts were made by these firms to build domestic demand for tea,
albeit with limited success (Lutgendorf, 2012).
Despite independence from British rule in 1947, plantation estates con-
tinued to be controlled by British interests in the post-independence period.
This posed an obstacle for value capture in what was (at that time) India’s
biggest export earner (Achinto, 2013). The government first attempted to
remedy this through the creation of the Tea Board of India in 1953. The
Board established a tax system, leading to tighter control of the industry
(Mohan and Sequeira, 2012). Today, the Tea Board continues to be respon-
sible for authorizing, registering and licensing all industrial activities per-
taining to the industry (Neilson and Pritchard, 2011). Plantation estates are
also governed by the Plantation Labour Act (PLA) of 1951. The PLA of-
fers statutory protection for workers and places responsibility for worker
welfare with the plantation owners. While criticisms have been levelled at
the lack of proper implementation, the PLA does in principle offer numer-
ous provisions for workers, including access to housing and medical care.
Furthermore, a tripartite system of negotiations on wages affords plantation
trade unions the right to enter into negotiations every three years with the
state government and the employers’ associations or industry representatives
(ibid.). By law, planters cannot pay less than the state-set wage. Yet in spite
of these legal protections, many tea workers continue to work for extremely
low wages and to suffer from various forms of exploitation due to circum-
vention of the law by the industry (ibid.). Cash wages are still determined
by piece rates and many workers are not on permanent contracts. NGO es-
timates from Assam put the percentage of workers on casual contracts at
50 per cent (BASIC, 2019). These workers do not have the same legal en-
titlements as permanent workers, and do not tend to have a regular source
of income.
During the 20th century, the global tea trade grew significantly and as late
as 1967 tea remained India’s largest export earner (Nayyar, 2007). Yet global
capital continued to dominate the industry, with profits repatriated to British
lead firms and little capital left for reinvestment (Raman, 2010). In 1973, this
led to further government interventions through the introduction of the For-
eign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA). The FERA placed restrictions on
the ability of foreign companies to maintain holdings, with all non-financial
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subsidiaries required to dilute foreign ownership to a maximum of 40 per
cent or to close operations (Majumdar, 2008). These changes allowed In-
dian firms to acquire a greater share of tea production, with the large Kanan
Devan plantations (formerly owned by a British company) taken over by
the Indian firm Tata Global Beverages during this period (Raman, 2010).
However, Hindustan Lever (the largest domestic lead firm in India and sub-
sidiary of global firm Unilever) was insulated from the FERA and retained
a 51 per cent equity on the condition that 60 per cent of the subsidiary’s
output was in the core sector (a set of capital-intensive industries prioritized
by the government for investment), and at least 10 per cent of the company’s
output was exported (Pant and Ramachandran, 2017). Having acquired Lip-
ton tea brand in 1972, the firm subsequently acquired Brooke Bond in
1984 leading to the further expansion of its estates in South India and As-
sam. Overall, these changing ownership structures were accompanied by in-
creased domestic consumption of tea as well as increased diversification of
exports.
The rupee–rouble trading agreement with the Soviet Union led to the near
monopolistic position of India as the primary source of tea imports for the
Eastern bloc between the 1960s and the 1990s, with Russia becoming the
most important market for Indian tea producers (Neilson and Pritchard,
2011). Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, India lost significant
global market share in tea production to key competitor countries (Indian
Institute of Foreign Trade, 2009). The stark decline in exports is evidenced
by the fact that while Indian tea exports accounted for 53 per cent of the
world’s global tea trade in 1971, this had fallen to 15 per cent in 2017 (India
Tea Association, 2019).
At present, tea is primarily produced in the North Eastern Region (pre-
dominantly in Assam and West Bengal) and in South India (particularly
in Kerala and Tamil Nadu) (Neilson and Pritchard, 2011). Teas grown in
Darjeeling, Assam and the Nilgiris have been conferred geographical indic-
tors under a WTO TRIPS agreement1 which recognizes their intrinsic value
(Das, 2009). The production of black tea is further classified as either ortho-
dox or CTC (crush, tear, curl) (Kadavil, 2007). CTC tea tends to be used in
lower-quality products such as the tea dust used in tea bags. Approximately
90 per cent of India’s current black tea production is CTC, and 10 per cent is
orthodox (India Tea Association, 2019). There are huge regional variations
depending on the type of tea and the region in which it is produced. Assam
CTC is only valued at around Rs 150 per kg while orthodox tea from Assam
can fetch Rs 500 per kg and Darjeeling orthodox can fetch Rs 1,500 per kg
(BASIC, 2019). Darjeeling is primarily export-oriented (approximately 70
per cent is exported) given the high values which can be fetched in foreign
markets (Datta, 2010). Generally speaking, the north-eastern states tend to
1. World Trade Organization agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights.
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Source: Tea Board of India (2018)
produce branded tea whereas southern-grown tea tends to be unbranded tea.
Table 2 demonstrates the dominance of Assam at the national level with over
50 per cent of India’s total tea production coming from that state. Approx-
imately 85–90 per cent of the tea produced in the North Eastern Region is
consumed domestically. In the southern regions, approximately 50 per cent
reaches export markets, with the rest consumed domestically (Indian Insti-
tute of Foreign Trade, 2009).
From the 1990s onwards, the Indian tea industry has been impacted by the
changing corporate structures of the world’s largest tea companies. A series
of mergers and acquisitions accompanied by the forward integration of pro-
duction (with an increased emphasis on core competencies by the multina-
tional corporations) has led to considerable consolidation of market power at
the global scale. At present, just three firms control approximately one fifth
of the global tea market: Unilever controls 12 per cent, Tata Global Bever-
ages controls 4 per cent and Twinings controls 2 per cent (Potts et al., 2014).
As Figure 1 illustrates, these firms source their products through a complex
set of intermediaries from producer to processor to blender. These inter-firm
relationships contain significant degrees of power asymmetry with implica-
tions for the capture of value at each stage of the production process (Ka-
davil, 2007; van der Wal, 2011). At the global scale, the industry overall has
shifted from vertical integration towards a value chain structure (see Fig-
ure 1) as firms have sought to advance their competitive position through
the outsourcing of lower value adding activities.
Brand-based competition defines the business models of these large firms,
and financial markets have further encouraged the valuation and protection
of these intangible assets (Neilson and Pritchard, 2011). Key brands such as
Lipton, PG Tips (Unilever) and Tetley (Tata Global Beverages) compete for
global market share, and the price of tea is therefore a major competitive
pressure for lead firms. Indian tea producers are left with little or no influ-
ence over the terms of trade in export markets, and the low prices fetched
continue to adversely impact on tea workers and farmers (LeBaron, 2018).
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Shifting Geographies of Indian Tea Trade: The Growth of the Domestic Market
While the GVC of Indian tea production has been extensively studied, lit-
tle is known about the domestic structures of production and how they have
shifted in recent decades. The domestic market for tea in India grew steadily
from the 1960s. Aside from the increased control of the industry by local
firms following the introduction of FERA (which may have created a more
positive perception of the industry among local consumers), the growth in
domestic consumption was also due to the introduction of new technologies
within tea processing which increased the availability of affordable tea (Lut-
gendorf, 2012). During the period 2000–18, the volume of tea consumed do-
mestically rose from 600 million kg to over 1,000 million kg (see Figure 2)
and while per capita consumption is still relatively low compared to some
other countries, the overall increase in demand has meant that the majority
of tea produced in India has fed domestic (as opposed to export) markets. By
2013, almost 90 per cent of tea produced was consumed domestically (Arya,
2013). The growth in the domestic market is correlated to the changing con-
sumer preferences of Indian consumers. As disposable income has risen,
consumers have switched from loose leaf teas towards premium, branded
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Figure 2. Changing Volume of Tea Production for Export versus Domestic
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Table 3. Preferences for Packaged vs Loose Leaf by Region
Zone Rural Urban
Loose Packaged Loose Packaged
North 11% 89% 8% 92%
West 18% 82% 17% 83%
Central 28% 72% 15% 85%
South 17% 83% 13% 87%
East 53% 47% 46% 54%
All India 25% 75% 20% 80%
Source: Tea Board of India (2018)
categories, with 2018 figures shown in Table 3 demonstrating preferences
for packaged tea across the majority of urban and rural India.
The growth in domestic tea consumption has been accompanied by stag-
nation in relation to the volumes of tea exported, as detailed in Figure 2
which illustrates this pattern from 2000 to 2018. These trends differ in
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comparison to other major tea producing countries such as Sri Lanka
and Kenya which continue to be export-oriented: in both cases, approx-
imately 95 per cent of their total production is exported (CPDA, 2008;
ILO, 2018). However, the Indian case bears some similarity to China where
approximately 66 per cent of tea production is domestically consumed
(Lei, 2016).
Within the domestic market, Hindustan Unilever and Tata Global Bever-
ages are the two largest firms and control approximately 27 per cent and 29
per cent of the market respectively (Potts et al., 2014). Hindustan Lever
is a subsidiary of the global firm Unilever, the world’s largest buyer of
tea. Tata Global Beverages is an Indian firm by origin but can be consid-
ered a global lead firm due to its ownership of Tetley, a UK firm which it
acquired in 2000. However, Hindustan Lever and Tata Global Beverages
can simultaneously be considered domestic in the sense that some seg-
ments of the two companies purchase tea solely for the local market and
with the majority of tea sourced from domestic producers — in contrast
to Unilever and Tetley, which, whilst part of the same overall conglom-
erate, source tea for global markets and from producers across many re-
gions. These intersections between the GVC and DVC highlight the merits
of adopting a value chain analysis which is inclusive of multiple, overlap-
ping chains of production (Langford, 2019). Alongside Hindustan Lever
and Tata Global Beverages, there are a number of large tea companies
which coordinate production for the domestic market. Interestingly, sev-
eral of these companies (such as Goodricke Group) operate as lead firms
in the domestic market but are also first-tier suppliers to global lead firms.
Traditionally, these domestic players have maintained vertically integrated
structures.
Large, branded companies have promoted packaged tea through extensive
marketing campaigns in which brand has been linked to quality (Mukherjee
et al., 2012). This trend parallels shifts in production occurring within the
global tea market, in which the move to increasingly sophisticated blending
recipes and the central role of branding have benefited larger multinational
corporations over smaller firms (Neilson and Pritchard, 2011). Whereas
branded tea in the domestic market was only 12 per cent more expensive
than unbranded tea in 2009, it was 70 per cent more expensive by 2017
(BASIC, 2019). These changing market conditions led Unilever to increase
its ownership share in its Indian subsidiary Hindustan Lever from 55 per
cent to 67 per cent (the legal maximum under Indian law) in 2013 (Unilever,
2015). This illustrates once again the limits of studying value chains from
a purely global perspective and demonstrates the porous boundaries of a
domestic versus global value chain analysis.
We can conclude that Indian tea production is no longer dominated by
exports to foreign countries but is instead increasingly dependent on the do-
mestic market. While value addition in select export markets may be high,
many large producers (planters) claim that they fetch good prices on the
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domestic market, relative to exports overall.2 However, this is primarily the
experience of larger firms involved in the production of premium teas, and
there may be variations depending on the quality of teas being sold. While
many studies have analysed the GVC dynamics that shape Indian tea pro-
duction, there remains a gap in our understanding of how domestic dynam-
ics shape the political economy of production (Neilson and Pritchard, 2011).
The following section sheds light on this question by drawing extensively on
primary research to analyse three important characteristics of domestic pro-
duction through a value chain lens.
THE CONTEMPORARY ORGANIZATION OF PRODUCTION IN THE
DOMESTIC MARKET: THREE KEY TRANSFORMATIONS
The Formation of a Domestic Value Chain for Indian Tea
Historically, the coordination of production for the domestic market has
been characterized by vertical integration in which tea firms selling to the
market exercised direct control over production via ownership of planta-
tion estates. However, the contemporary coordination of production for the
domestic market has radically changed. The following section explores the
key political economic factors which led to an increased fragmentation of
production and the emergence of value chain dynamics within the domestic
market.
During the 2000s, the vertically integrated production system became in-
creasingly untenable for the largest domestic firms owing to price volatility
on global tea markets. In 2001, global tea prices plummeted due to oversup-
ply which led to a systemic crisis within the industry (CEC, 2007). Many
plantation estates closed because managers were no longer able to pay the
necessary taxes and overheads (Chattopadhayay, 2005). In addition, many
estates failed to meet yield targets and to maintain the quality of tea pro-
duced (Larsen, 2016). At the height of the crisis, approximately 100,000
permanent tea workers were affected by estate closures with NGO reports
indicating chronic impoverishment in tea-growing regions (CEC, 2007). As
workers faced destitution, estate owners protested the cost of their legal obli-
gations under the PLA by claiming that compliance with costly regulations
undermined the competitiveness of the industry (Neilson and Pritchard,
2011). This remains their perspective today.3
For the largest domestic firms, the crisis demonstrated the significant
commercial risks in continued plantation ownership. Both Hindustan Lever
2. Interview, Managing Director, Planter 2, 7 July 2015; Interview, Managing Director, Planter
4, 20 July 2015; Interview, CEO, Planter 5, 3 August 2015.
3. Interview, Managing Director, Planter 2, 7 July 2015; Interview, Managing Director, Planter
4, 20 July 2015; Interview, Managing Director, Planter 6, 2 July 2015.
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and Tata Global Beverages owned significant plantation estates in the north-
eastern and southern tea growing regions, but in 2005, Hindustan Lever an-
nounced its plans to sell the majority of its estates. The sale of Hindustan
Lever’s plantations to McLeod Russel made the latter company the largest
tea producer in the world (Dutta, 2019). Tata Global Beverages feared that
it would become uncompetitive in light of Hindustan Lever’s decision, and
also sold its operations in Assam and in the Nilgiris, but maintained own-
ership of its Darjeeling tea estates due to the higher sale prices of this re-
gion’s production (Raman, 2010). Prior to the sale of its Kanan Devan es-
tates, Tata downsized its labour force by offering workers voluntary retire-
ment packages a year before the sale.4 This resulted in the intensification of
labour amongst the remaining workforce. Given that Tata still sources tea
from the estates, this intensification has essentially allowed Tata and other
firms to ‘buy the tea at a lower cost’ (Raman, 2010: 167). Between the two
firms, it is estimated that a total of 36,000 workers were laid off through
the sale of estates (Groosman, 2011; Raman, 2010). New plantation com-
panies were formed through this process of vertical ‘dis-integration’ based
in the tea-growing regions in Assam, Kerala and Tamil Nadu. They include
the Kanan Devan Hills Plantations and Amalgamated Plantations Private
Limited (formerly owned by Tata Global Beverages) and McLeod Russel
(formerly owned by Hindustan Unilever).
Given the significant combined market share of Hindustan Lever and Tata
Global Beverages, the coordination of production for the domestic market
was radically transformed by the construction of a DVC characterized by
similar sourcing practices to those used by lead firms in global markets. By
creating a DVC, both firms were able to eliminate the mounting risks associ-
ated with the management of plantation estates. Firstly, they no longer had to
meet the costs of running plantations, which included compliance costs as-
sociated with national regulations and law.5 Instead, supplier firms would be
responsible for compliance and for meeting such costs. Secondly, the firms
were afforded more flexibility within their domestic sourcing base. While
retaining some degree of ownership (and therefore creating dependency)
within the new plantation companies formed, the firms were also able to geo-
graphically expand their supplier base.6 This reduced the risks associated
with pest outbreaks as well as risks posed by trade union unrest. These lead
firms hold contracts with their ‘priority factories’ and spread their sourcing
of tea through a 1:8 ratio, meaning that every kilo of tea is sourced from
eight different sites or factories.7 By switching from vertically integrated
4. In the case of the sale of the Kanan Devan Hills Plantations, Tata instituted an employee
buyout. For more information on the case, see Raman (2010: 166–67).
5. Interview, CEO, Lead Firm 1, 4 June 2015; Interview, Head of Sustainability, Lead Firm 2,
16 July 2015.
6. Interview, CEO, Lead Firm 1, 4 June 2015; Interview, Head of Sustainability, Lead Firm 2,
16 July 2015.
7. Interview, CEO, Lead Firm 1, 4 June 2015.
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Table 4. Structures of Ownership in the Indian Tea Industry
Type Size Ownership Processing Facilities




<200 hectares Single proprietor or
partnership firms
Processing facilities may





>200 hectares Large companies, limited
liability companies or
state/worker ownership
Processing facilities on site
Source: Kadavil (2007)
systems of production to a model of outsourcing across a broader supplier
base, domestic lead firms have freed themselves to further specialize in the
marketing and branding of tea products, leading to increased domestic mar-
ket consolidation.
The (Re)Organization of Tea Production in the Domestic Value Chain
By focusing the frame of empirical investigation on the DVC, the role of the
informal sector within Indian tea production is brought to light. For while
global lead firms sourcing for export markets only source tea from plan-
tation estates, tea sold in the domestic market is extensively sourced from
smallholder producers. GVC analysis obfuscates the significance of these
producers due to its exclusive focus on export-oriented production whereas
a DVC lens invites scrutiny of these additional sites of production. The co-
existence of smallholders alongside plantation estates and registered tea gar-
dens creates a segmented industry in which different regulations and norms
apply to different types of producer. For example, plantation estates and reg-
istered tea gardens operate in the formal sector and are subject to national
regulations set by the Government of India, including the PLA. In contrast,
smallholders operate in the informal sector and outside the purview of state
regulation. Table 4 illustrates the legal definitions that constitute these vary-
ing ownership structures.
Smallholder production under Indian law is defined as a farm or enter-
prise of less than 10.12 hectares in area. As Table 5 illustrates, in 1991,
smallholder production was responsible for just 7 per cent of India’s total
tea production. Yet by 2019, smallholder production was estimated to pro-
vide over 48 per cent of total tea production, with an estimated 180,448
small tea growers producing tea on 161,648 hectares (India Tea Associa-
tion, 2019). The growth of this production segment has been exponential;
during the period 2014–18 production by smallholders rose by 248 million
kg, an increase of 62 per cent (ibid.). During this same period, production in
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Table 5. Growth of Smallholder Production in India in terms of Total Tea
Production (%), 1991–2019







Sources: India Tea Association (2019); Tea Board of India (2013)
Table 6. Production (million kg) of Plantations and Registered Tea Gardens vs
Smallholders in India, 2019
North India South India All India
Registered tea gardens and plantation estates 575.46 116.80 692.26 (52%)
Small growers 538.30 108.07 646.37 (48%)
Total 1,113.76 2,24.87 1,338.63
Source: India Tea Association (2019)
the formal sector declined by over 100 million kg, a decline of 13 per cent
(ibid.). The total production (in million kg) of plantations versus smallhold-
ers by region is detailed in Table 6.
The expansion of smallholder tea farming was linked to both market fac-
tors and government initiatives. Favourable tea prices during the 1990s due
to undersupply on the global market made tea cultivation attractive to pro-
ducers (Kadavil, 2007). Yet, this expansion was also heavily supported by
the creation of government programmes which encouraged farmers to con-
vert from vegetable to tea production (Seddon and Schmidt, 2017). In As-
sam alone, state efforts to popularize small tea production has led to an
increase from 657 farmers in 1990 to over 84,000 in 2019 (BASIC, 2019).
While smallholders have historically played a marginal role in Indian
tea production, their rapid expansion has significantly altered the domestic
structures of production. Smallholder production has been linked to higher
productivity as compared to plantation estates due to the intensive and man-
ual nature of work needed for tea cultivation in the absence of machinery:
pruning, spraying and plucking are typically done by hand within smaller
sites of production (Hayami and Damodaran, 2004). The regular plucking
of the densely packed tea leaves by smallholders is said to increase the over-
all productivity in terms of yield per hectare (ibid.), and Indian smallholders
in the tea industry are more productive than plantations, as illustrated by
Table 7.
A further competitive advantage of smallholder production is the fact
that farmers are self-employed and make use, first and foremost, of fam-
ily labour. Where waged labour is used on smallholder sites, farmers are
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Table 7. Productivity of Smallholders versus Plantation Estates, 2011–13 (kg
per hectare)





Source: Tea Board of India (2013)
not constrained by any broader regulations regarding wages, nor are they
required to provide housing or wider social support to their workers. A dual
structure of tea production for the domestic market thus emerges, in which
plantation estates are obliged to follow the PLA (which creates additional
costs) while smallholders are able to produce cheap tea without having to
cover any additional non-wage welfare expenditure for day labourers. Fig-
ure 3 illustrates the complexity within the DVC caused by these develop-
ments and highlights the interconnections between the dual structures of
domestic market production.
Smallholders occupy a weak bargaining position in the DVC relative to
the larger plantation estates. This is due to the fact that the leaf must be pro-
cessed within five to seven hours and yet the majority of growers do not have
access to processing facilities (Kadavil, 2007). Instead, they must transport
and sell the leaf to bought-leaf factories or estate factories within a short pe-
riod of time. Intermediaries, known as agents, transport the leaf on behalf of
smallholders who do not have access to a vehicle (ibid.). In such a context,
smallholders are vulnerable to low returns on their product and to adverse
incorporation into the market (Larsen, 2016). While the premium market for
tea is growing, there is still a significant segment of the population which
consumes low-grade tea. The perception of tea as an ‘everyday drink’ con-
tributes to relative price inelasticity in the lower segments of the tea market
(Tea Board of India, 2018).
An important development within the DVC is the subcontracting of pro-
duction by plantation estates to smallholders. As Table 8 illustrates, on av-
erage plantation estates in India are sourcing around 17.9 per cent of tea
from smallholders. This has the potential to undermine the agency of tea
plantation workers, as it provides plantation owners with a cheap source of
tea.8 Relatedly, the establishment and growth of smallholder production may
eventually lead to competitive advantage in exports. For example, key com-
peting countries such as Kenya and Sri Lanka have long had a more estab-
lished base of smallholders and are less dependent upon plantation estates in
comparison to India (ILO, 2018; KEPSA, 2014). Together, the divestment
8. Interview, Managing Director, Planter 2, 7 July 2015; Interview, Managing Director, Planter
3, 19 July 2015.
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Source: author’s own construction
of domestic lead firms from production (i.e. vertical dis-integration) and the
expansion of smallholder farms in India have transformed the political econ-
omy of tea production in recent decades. This leads to the question of how
institutional and regulatory actors have responded to these developments
within the domestic value chain.
New Institutions of Governance
The dominance of value chain dynamics in the domestic market has led
to new commercial and institutional pressures. Domestic lead firms have
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Table 8. Percentage of Smallholder-sourced Tea in Estate Factories, by
Region, 2017–18
State RTG% STG% % of STG in estate
factories production
Assam 57.82 42.18 21.79
West Bengal 46.34 53.66 18.45
Others 42.53 57.47 19.25
Tamil Nadu 33.58 61.42 15.76
Kerala 82.23 17.77 14.31
Karnataka 94.97 5.03 0.53
All India 53.09 46.91 19.73
Notes: RTG = registered tea garden; STG = smallholder tea garden
Source: India Tea Association (2019)
become sensitive to quality and food safety concerns while simultaneously
becoming less able to maintain direct control over production due to divest-
ment from plantation ownership. The growth of smallholder production has
made control over production ever more difficult given the introduction of
new intermediaries within the value chain (including agents and bought-leaf
factories) and the geographical fragmentation of growers.9
This fragmentation creates new vulnerabilities for Hindustan Lever and
Tata Global Beverages who are increasingly dependent on this smallholder
value chain but whose key competitive advantage lies in the protection and
enhancement of their branded products. Growing Indian consumer engage-
ment with branded goods and the implicit link between brand and quality
leaves domestic lead firms vulnerable to potential food safety, social and/or
environmental scandals. This became evident in 2013 when a national NGO
campaign exposed illegal levels of pesticide present within tea sold by do-
mestic brands (Greenpeace, 2013). While pesticide misuse was identified
in both the plantation and smallholder segments, the geographical fragmen-
tation of smallholder producers created additional governance difficulties
because processing factories were often unaware of where their tea had ori-
ginated.10 This led to a higher perception of risk associated with the sourc-
ing of leaf from the bought-leaf factories.11 Hindustan Lever, Tata Global
Beverages and the Tea Board faced mounting pressure as a result which
drove a new interest in governing production embedded within the DVC.
While the Tea Board launched a regulatory instrument called the Plant Pro-
tection Code in response, this was a self-certification programme and came
under immediate criticism due to the lack of a strong enforcement mecha-
nism. The domestic lead firms (Hindustan Lever and Tata) in turn led the
9. Interview, CEO, Lead Firm 1, 4 June 2015; Interview, CEO, NGO 8, 12 August 2015.
10. Interview, CEO, NGO 2, 3 June 2015; Interview, CEO, NGO 8, 12 August 2015.
11. Interview, Head of Sustainability, Lead Firm 2, 16 July 2015; Interview, CEO, Planter 5, 3
August 2015.
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design of a new sustainability standard for the domestic market, known as
Trustea; the Tea Board was later invited to join this initiative and accepted
(Langford, 2019).
The Trustea code was designed to govern food safety and social standards
for India’s domestic tea market. Its development can be read as a regulatory
response to the limitations posed by the legal separation of production be-
tween lead and supplier firms, and the challenges of coordinating ever-more
fragmented chains of production. While Trustea is not being explicitly led
by consumer pressures, many Indian firms believe that consumers will soon
exhibit a greater interest in the governance of tea production.12 The creation
of Trustea marks the creation of a new mode of governing the DVC and
also reflects the ascendancy of private as well as public standards to govern
production within the domestic sphere. The emphasis on private rather than
public mechanisms perhaps reflects the relative failure of the Tea Board to
tackle systemic regulatory issues within the industry: this is certainly a view
which is widely shared among stakeholders in the private sector and within
Indian civil society.13
CONCLUSION
Domestic value chains coordinated by domestic lead firms are increasingly
prominent within the global South. In India, the expansion of domestic con-
sumption in the late 20th and early 21st centuries has shifted tea production
from an export-oriented to a domestic-oriented industry. Thus, the political
economy of tea production as a whole is increasingly shaped by domes-
tic rather than global market factors. The significance of local trade and
production to Indian tea producers challenges the tendency of development
scholars to focus on the global value chain dynamics of commodity produc-
tion and advocates for a more polycentric approach to the study of global
trade and production.
This article has demonstrated the precise ways through which domestic
pressures have transformed the political economy of tea production in re-
cent decades, and the regulatory implications of this transformation. It iden-
tified key three shifts within contemporary domestic trade and production
and the key governance challenges associated with these. First, the article
identified value chain dynamics as a recent phenomenon within the local
tea market, created by the decision of the largest domestic firms to divest
ownership of their plantation estates. The emergence of new intermediaries
12. Interview, Head of Sustainability, Lead Firm 2, 16 July 2015; Interview, Managing Director,
Planter 2, 7 July 2015; Interview, Managing Director, Planter 3, 19 July 2015.
13. Interview, Head of Sustainability, Lead Firm 2, 16 July 2015; Interview, Managing Director,
Planter 2, 7 July 2015; Interview, Managing Director, Planter 4, 20 July 2015; Interview,
CEO, NGO 3, 14 August 2015.
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as a result further extended the length and complexity of the domestic sup-
ply chain. Second, the article highlighted the dependence of domestic lead
firms on smallholder production. This dependence increased price competi-
tion between suppliers and placed an ever-growing percentage of production
outside the purview of state oversight. Third, the article illustrated that pri-
vate standards have been developed to govern the domestic value chain in
response to the challenges of domestic (out)sourcing and the expansion of
smallholder production.
Domestic markets in the South have often been characterized by low
barriers to entry, lax regulatory frameworks and cut-throat competition
(Gereffi, 2014; Kaplinsky and Farooki, 2010). Yet, debates continue as to
whether these dynamics will remain characteristic of production as emerg-
ing economies expand. On the one hand, the case of Indian tea partially
confirms the picture of a market under increased competitive pressures and
subject to low barriers to entry. Outsourcing has allowed domestic lead firms
to focus on market expansion while simultaneously placing price pressure
on the now ‘independent’ suppliers and smallholders. Their significant do-
mestic market share of 56 per cent increases the power of the lead firms
to dictate prices. These competitive dynamics are further entrenched due
to the growth of smallholder production (where production costs are lower
due to the use of family labour). The cheaper price of tea in the smallholder
segment has produced fierce competition between the smallholders and the
plantation estates.
On the other hand, evidence suggests that domestic markets face new
regulatory pressures in the context of expansion. Lead firms have come un-
der increased pressure to regulate production as a result of growing civil
society and institutional interest, with evidence that some NGOs have suc-
cessfully driven firms to improve the governance of their supply chains. The
creation of Trustea can be read as a response to these pressures. However,
the fact that private rather than public standards have been used arguably
exposes the weakness of public institutions, particularly when it comes to
the issue of production within informal spaces. Table 9 illustrates some of
the key challenges and opportunities created (from a regulatory perspective)
through these three distinct transformations within the production of Indian
tea for the domestic market. For example, some NGOs argue that modern-
ization of the PLA and affording plantation labourers the same rights as agri-
cultural labourers would have some social benefits. However, trade unions
argue instead that the PLA should be strengthened in terms of its regulatory
oversight and implementation.14
Overall, this article has shed light on the ‘black box’ of domestic mar-
kets which continue to be overlooked within GVC studies. The evidence
14. Interview, CEO, NGO 3, 14 August 2015; Interview, Director, Trade Union 2, 11 July 2015;
Interview, Director, Trade Union 3, 9 July 2015; Interview, Trade Union 5, 7 June 2015;
Interview, Trade Union 6, 4 June 2015.
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Decline of public regulations’
influence over the Indian tea
industry
Modernization of the PLA and granting
plantation labourers the same rights as
agricultural labourers could have social
benefits (NGOs)
PLA could be strengthened in terms of
regulatory oversight and implementation
(Trade Unions)
Increasing lead firm regulation of small tea




No direct ownership of
production by lead firms
Lead firms focus on protection of intangible
assets leading to increased engagement with







Poor enforcement of public
regulations and few
alternative private standards
Increase in new constellations of actors
involved in shaping governance of social
standards, such as local civil society
organizations
Convergence and normalization of global
norms around social standards by lead firms
engaged in Northern and Southern markets
Growth of Southern market consumer
pressure
Source: author’s own construction
from the Indian tea industry demonstrates that the expansion of large do-
mestic markets in the global South is leading to significant transformations
within political economies of production. The increased use of subcontract-
ing and outsourcing, the growth of informal production and the emergence
of new regulatory standards demonstrate points of both divergence and con-
vergence in comparison to the global value chain. These findings call for
further research into domestic value chains in which complex interactions
within national supply chains are continuing to impact and shape the future
dynamics of production in an era of polycentric trade.
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